Reply to Professor Puccetti

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I thank Puccetti for his kind and very generous introductory comments and helpful critique. The majority of our differences seem not to be serious. In regard to the split-brain subjects seeing two different things at the same position in space at the same time, Puccetti spells out in detail exactly the point I was hoping to make more succinctly and assumed would be taken for granted by readers acquainted with the split-brain literature. It seems a legitimate subtlety to refer to the bisected brain in the singular here just as one often refers to a pair, or a couple, in the singular.

There also is little basic disagreement with his inference concerning a "full subjective visual field in each cerebral hemisphere." I elaborated much the same point on quite different grounds as a general principle of cerebral organization some years ago (Sperry 1970). We part company on this, however, where the further inference is drawn that the result should be the perception of two full visual fields, with their contents, seen side by side, and on the use of this to bolster the argument for two conscious persons in the normal brain. What is known about the neural basis of perceived position in space is overlooked here, I think, as is the concept of subjective properties as functional derivatives. I conceive the combined right-left processes as reinforcing, in unity, the same percept in psychological space, not two separate percepts side by side.

I concur with Puccetti's point that nothing in the split-brain evidence itself would definitely exclude any of the four traditional alternative interpretations of the mind-brain relation he cites in favor of that proposed. I would emphasize, however, that no empirical proof is yet available at this stage for *any* mind-brain theory, and the same applies to the issue regarding one or two persons in the normal intact brain. Many reasons, meantime, for favoring the "modified interactionist" or "causal" concept of consciousness over previous alternatives are extensively outlined in the original articles referred to. More specifically, the very

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problems with which Puccetti himself is primarily involved, namely, those concerning unity versus left-right duality in psychological phenomena across the midline, with and without the commissures, I find to be more readily and satisfactorily dealt with in the "functional derivative," causal terms of the proposed mind-brain model than by any of the traditional alternatives. Puccetti's quarrels with the proposed causal view of consciousness seem in general to fall largely in the area of terminology and semantics rather than being directed at the basic concept as such, aspects of which, I am pleased to note, Puccetti himself has started to defend since 1974.

I must disagree firmly with the closing observation that it does not seem to make "any practical difference whatever which of *several* mind-brain theories is correct so far as value determination is con-